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Abstract
The OPA model calculates the long-term risk of cascading blackouts by simulating cascading outages and
the slow process of network upgrade in response to
blackouts. We validate OPA on a detailed 19402 bus
network model of the Western Electricity Coordinating
Council (WECC) interconnection with publicly available data. To do this, we examine scalings on a series of WECC interconnection models with increasing
detail. The most detailed, 19402 bus network has more
tree structures at the edges of the main mesh structure,
and we extend the OPA model to account for this. The
higher-risk cascading outages are the large cascades
that extend across interconnections, so validating cascading models on large networks is crucial to understanding how the real grid behaves. Finally, exploring
networks with mixed mesh and tree like structure has implications for the risk analysis for both the transmission
grid and other network infrastructures.

1. Introduction
Cascading outages are the main way that electric
transmission grid blackouts become widespread. While
there are many different models and simulations of cascading outages producing plausible sequences of outages [1, 2], a necessary next step is to validate these
models. Indeed the IEEE PES cascading failure working group is vigorously pursuing the benchmarking and
validation of cascading outage simulations [3, 4].
Cascading outages and blackouts occur at all scales,
but the larger blackouts that cascade across interconnections, although infrequent, have higher risk than the
smaller blackouts because the probability distribution of
blackout size has a heavy tail, making large blackouts
more likely than might be expected [5]. Therefore it is
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important to validate cascading models and simulations
for large interconnections.
The OPA model1 [6–9] simulates cascading blackouts
in power grid transmission systems as a complex system
in which the the reliability is shaped over time by the
grid evolution and the engineering responses to blackouts. This paper validates OPA on a series of models of
the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC)
interconnection in North America with publicly available data, including the observed historical distribution
of blackout size. Here we concentrate on the probability
distribution of blackout size and other measures of the
cascading; the duration and cost components of blackout risk are also challenging and are discussed and approximately quantified in [10].
Our network models of the WECC range from 1553
buses to 19402 buses, allowing the examination of
scalings and topology as the model detail increases.
Importantly, the smaller network models have mainly
a meshed character, whereas the 19402 bus network
model has a meshed central portion that has many appendages of tree-like form. Therefore we extend the
OPA model to properly account for this change in topological structure in the 19402 bus network model.
Previous work [11] validated the OPA model using
data from the WECC on the 1553 bus network. This
paper describes the following further advances:
1. Validation on 9402 and 19402 bus network models of
the WECC interconnection. This is enabled by rewriting
OPA to be much faster [12].
2. Description of network size scaling and change in
structure as the network model of the interconnection
is made more detailed. While familiar to many engineers, the fact that differently detailed models of the
same transmission grid can have a different topological
1 OPA stands for “Oak Ridge National Lab, Power Systems Engineering Research Center, and University of Alaska”.
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structure, or regions with different structure, seems to
have been overlooked in the complex network literature.
3. Enhancement of OPA, originally designed for networks with mainly a meshed structure, to handle networks that also have significant tree structures.
4. Enhancement of OPA to better model load variation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the OPA model. The model networks
of the WECC system used in this paper are described in
Section 3 and summary review of the available WECC
data is given in Section 4. Section 5 presents the initial results of the OPA model, showing some problems
when applied to the 19402 bus model. Section 6 investigates the reason for the problems and Section 7 presents
a new modification of OPA addressing those issues. Finally, discussion and conclusions are given in Section 8.

2. OPA Model
The OPA model, which is defined in detail in [6–8],
describes the complex dynamical evolution of a power
transmission system. There are two timescales: a fast
timescale describing the cascading process of the blackouts and a slow time scale describing the evolution of
the grid. In the fast timescale, OPA models the transmission lines, loads and generators using the DC load flow
approximation. The evolution of the system starts from
a good dispatch solution for a given network, then for
each day, independent random line outages are triggered
with probability p0 . Whenever a line is outaged, the generation and load are redispatched using standard linear
programming methods. The cost function is weighted to
ensure that load shedding is avoided where possible. If
any lines were overloaded during the optimization, then
these lines are outaged with a fixed probability p1 . This
leads to a process of testing for outages and redispatch
that is iterated until there are no more line outages. The
total load shed is then the total power lost during the
blackout. The way the cascading is modeled neglects
many of the details of the cascading processes in a real
blackout and the timing of events, but it does represent
in a simplified way a process of cascading overloads and
outages that is consistent with some of its basic features.
In the slow timescale, OPA carries out the complex system dynamics of the transmission grid that is evolving
in response to a slowly increasing power demand and
also whose reliability is shaped via engineering that upgrades the system in response to blackouts. The slow
complex system dynamics is carried out first by multiplying each day all loads by a fixed parameter g that represents the daily rate of increase in electricity demand,
which we take to be about 2% a year. To maintain coor-

dination between generation capacity and transmission
capacity, the generation maximum power increases after
a period of time T when the capacity margin decreases
below a given critical level ∆P/P . A second process in
the slow time scale is that when a blackout occurs, the
lines involved in the blackout have their line flow limits
increased slightly by multiplying by a parameter µ. That
is, the parts of the system involved in the last blackout
are upgraded. For model simplicity, the grid topology
remains fixed in the upgrade of the lines. A list of the
main OPA parameters is given in Table 1.
Table 1. Main OPA parameters
0.106/NL probability initial line outage
63.0/NL
probability an overloaded
line outages
γ
1.07
width of load variation
∆P/P
0.2
critical margin
µ
1.07
line upgrade rate
T
365
time to build new generators
NL is number of lines in network
NL = 2114 (1553 bus network)
NL = 3345 (2504 bus network)
NL = 22113 (19402 bus network)
p0
p1

On top of the increase of the averaged load, there is
also a daily variation on the demand to represent the
varying conditions of the power grid. In this paper,
the modeling of the variation of the demand has been
changed and is discussed in the Appendix.
Given assumptions about blackout cost [5], OPA can
calculate the distribution of blackout size over the longterm and hence the blackout risk, accounting for the way
that the power grid evolves as blackouts shape this risk.
Therefore these calculations can be used to evaluate the
long-term impact of transmission system upgrades on
the risk of small blackouts and of large blackouts. These
calculations for an evolving grid do not address the short
term risk of blackout of a fixed power grid.

3. WECC network models
We have three model networks of the WECC transmission system with increasing detail; they have 1553,
2504, and 19402 buses respectively, and are shown
in Fig. 1. As expected, the overall global structure
of the three networks is very similar. However, as
the modeling detail increases, the detailed network
structure changes. The 19402 bus network has many
more tree-type structures attached to the main meshed
part of the network. The 1553 bus network has 11%
tree-type lines, the 2504 bus network has 19% tree-type
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the modeling of the blackout complex system dynamics. The main source of data on blackouts in the North
American grid is the North American Electrical Reliability Council (NERC). This data includes power lost,
number of customers with service, duration of the blackout, etc. Analysis of this data [5, 10, 13] shows the existence of power law regions in the probability distribution
function and in the rank function of the blackout size as
measured by the power lost.

Figure 1. Three model networks with 1553,
2504, and 19402 buses respectively. The
bottom right frame blows up a small portion of an edge of the 19402 bus network
to show tree structures.
lines, while the 19402 bus network has 56% tree-type
lines. The ratio of lines to busses for the 1553 and 2504
bus networks is approximately 1.35, whereas the 19404
bus network has the lower (more tree-like) ratio of 1.14.
This is also indicated by the network clustering, which
reduces by more then a factor of 4 from 0.078 for the
1553 bus network to 0.019 for the 19402 bus network,
showing that there are less possible paths between any
two buses chosen randomly for the 19402 bus network.
We use the smaller 1553 bus network explore parameters, because the calculations are faster and we can get
very good statistical information by performing the calculations for 200 000 simulated days. The objective
of this parameter exploration is to find a set of parameters which lead to results that are consistent with the
WECC data. To have a consistent set of parameters for
the other two networks, we apply the following scaling
conditions:
p0 NL = constant
p1 NL = constant

(1)

where NL is the number of lines of the network. All the
other parameters are the same for the three networks.
We found in the past using artificial networks that this
way of scaling the parameters gives consistent results.

4. Historical data for WECC outages
There are a variety of data available (or potentially
available) on blackouts and outages of the WECC transmission grid. They are all important for validation of

Another source of information we have used is the
detailed transmission line outage data for 8864 outages
recorded by a WECC utility over a period of ten years
[14], which is similar to that collected by the Transmission Availability Data System [15]. The value of this detailed outage data for validation is noted and the authors
are very grateful that this data has been made available.
Given the data available to us, we must assume that this
data, which is only for one WECC utility, is representative of data for the whole WECC. The data has been
processed to extract information on cascading events, including the probability distribution of outages in the first
generation, the probability distribution of the total number of outages after cascading, and the probability distribution of the number of generations (iterations) in the
cascades. Details of the data processing are in [16].
We also extracted from the detailed outage data the
average propagation λ. This is the standard Harris estimator for the cascade propagation [16, 17]. λ is calculated by taking the average of the ratio of child failures
(generation i) to parent failures (generation i-1) over all
the cascading events. This parameter provides important information on how cascades propagate that needs
to be matched by the model. Another issue in comparing with data is the definition of a blackout. The thresholds for a reportable blackout include uncontrolled loss
of 300 MW or more of firm system load for more than
15 minutes from a single incident, load shedding of 100
MW or more implemented under emergency operational
policy, loss of electric service to more than 50 000 customers for one hour or more, and other criteria detailed
in the United States Department of Energy form EIA417. Since we are carrying out the calculations over
many decades in order to have good statistics and we
have a constant increase in the demand during this period of time, it does not make sense to use a fixed threshold for the power loss. Instead we use a threshold for
the power shed normalized to the power demand. This
threshold is 0.0001 for a blackout with cascading and for
a blackout with no cascading, which implies a localized
event, we use a threshold of 0.0004.
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5. Solution for 1553 and 2504 bus networks
and scaling to the 19402 bus network
Exploring the parameters listed in Table 1, one can
find multiple solutions for the 1553 bus network that
match the WECC data reasonably well. Maintaining
the parameters in reasonable ranges we can find a few
solutions relatively close to each other. Here, we only
discuss one typical solution. The scaling laws in (1) are
then used to obtain the parameters p0 and p1 for the 2504
bus network. This scaling works well. The parameters
obtained for these two networks are listed in Table 1.
As examples of how the numerical results from OPA
match the WECC data, first we show in Fig. 2 the rank
function for the load shed normalized to the power demand for the 1553 and 2504 bus model networks compared to the data. The agreement is very good for all
range of values.
Another important data characteristic to match with
the model is the probability distribution of the number
of line outages per blackout. The results for the 1553
and 2504 bus model networks are shown in Fig. 3 and
the agreement is good. Both sets of results show that
the model can reproduce very well the tails of the distributions and so we can expect to reproduce the average
cascade propagation in the blackouts. To test that we
compare in Fig. 4 the λ function for the two model networks and the data. We limit the comparison to the first
20 iterations because the size of the model networks limits the number of iterations. Thus, using a larger sized
network we should be able to extend this comparison to
a larger number of iterations. In this limited case, the
comparison shown in Fig. 4 is satisfactory. Other data
characteristics are also matched by the model, but due
to limited space we will present only these three measures in this paper.
The next step in this validation is to scale these results
to the 19402 bus network using the appropriate scaling
factors (1). The result of the scaling for the 19402 bus
network compared with the data for the rank function for
the load shed normalized to the power demand and the
probability distribution function of the number of line
outages per blackout is shown in Fig. 5. The comparison fails fairly badly in this case, and is caused by the
mixture of topological structures in the 19402 bus network as discussed in the next section.

6. Reducing the tree-like parts of the 19402
bus network
As mentioned earlier, the 19402 bus network has
substructures with different network topological charac-

ter. In particular, there are many filamentary and treelike subnetworks attached to the main meshed structure.
This can be seen in Fig. 1, which enlarges a small portion of the boundary of the 19402 bus network.
We built three new networks by peeling off or compacting some of these substructures:
1. An 8590 bus network is obtained from the 19402 bus
network by substituting for the tree-like structures attached to the core network. Each tree is substituted with
a single bus with the total load and generation of the tree.
2. A 7427 bus network is obtained from the 19402 bus
network by substituting for the appendix structures attached to the core network. An appendix is defined as
a subnetwork connected to the core network by a single
bus. Note that an appendix can contain a loop. Each appendix is substituted by a single bus with the total load
and generation of the appendix.
3. A 4866 bus network is obtained from the 7427 bus
network by substituting chains of buses (that is, consecutive buses with degree 2) with a single bus with the
chain total load and generation.
The three networks are shown in Fig. 7, and are not
intended to be good models for the WECC; they are
built to study the effects of suppressing tree-like parts
of 19402 bus network. With these reduced networks we
can test the scaling given by (1) and compare the results
with the data. Figs. 6 and 8 show the rank function
for the load shed normalized to the power demand for
the three networks together with the WECC data. (For
estimating the propagation λ in the 4866 bus network
in Fig. 8, there is more noise for larger λ due to limited
data). We clearly do not encounter the problem that
we had with the 19402 bus network in Fig. 5. The
numerical results describe the data very well. The same
happens with the probability distribution function of
the number of outages and iterations per blackout and
the λ propagation function shown in Figs. 6 and 8. The
study in this section of the hypothetical removal of the
tree-like substructures identifies the problem for the
realistic 19402 bus network.

7. Enhanced OPA model
As described in Section 6, the problem with the scaling with size comes from the regions of the 19402 bus
network with a tree-like structure. The two parameters
that define the probability of outage, p0 and p1 , scale
following (1) for a fixed topology, but their values can
have a different impact on the complex system dynamics of the cascading depending on the topology of the
network. Thus to model the electric grid adequately, we
must consider different values of the parameters for the
regions with different topology.
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Figure 2. Rank function for the load shed normalized to the power demand for the historical
data and the 1553 and 2504 bus networks
We first found that varying the value of the initial
failure probability p0 for the tree-like region did not significantly change the results, so we retain the same value
of p0 throughout the network. As mentioned earlier,
the values used for both p0 and ∆P/P are determined,
within a range, by the real grid data. The important parameter here is p1 , the probability that an overloaded line
outages. Determining p1 is more complicated because
its real-world counterpart combines a number of factors
and is therefore difficult to determine directly from the
real grid data. We therefore determine p1 phenomenologically by adjusting it within a physically reasonable
range to make the OPA output fit the real world data. It
should be noted that p1 is not an arbitrary factor, rather
a poorly determined physical parameter, and one of the
factors which affects p1 is the topology. We modified p1
by dividing the value of p1 for the tree-like lines by 10.
Requiring a decrease in p1 for the tree-like lines makes
qualitative sense because of the different upgrading that
follows from the different ways that power is redistributed and load is shed in tree-like versus a meshed
topologies. In particular, in a tree-like part of the
network supplying load, outage of a line disconnects all
downstream buses and always causes some blackout and
hence in OPA always a line upgrade, while in a meshed
network there are several paths to provide load power,
and a line outage more rarely causes a blackout. Therefore for a balanced upgrade of all the network, overloads
in the tree-like portion must outage less frequently.
The tenfold decrease in p1 for the tree-like lines was
confirmed empirically by running OPA to show that it
is adequate to describe the WECC data. Figs. 9 and 10

show the rank function for the load shed normalized to
the power demand and probability distribution function
of the number of line outages per blackout for the 19402
bus network. There is very good agreement with data
and the mismatch shown in Fig. 5 is no longer present.
Obtaining sufficient statistical accuracy for these results
on the 19402 bus network required 50 days of computation. The parameters for the computations are in Table 1.

8. Conclusion
Proper risk analysis requires a well validated model.
For this, it is important to simulate cascading on large
network models in order to properly represent the
interconnection-scale cascades that are the highest risk
cascading blackouts. Accordingly we extend and validate the OPA model on a 19402 bus network model of
the WECC.
OPA was previously designed and validated on
smaller WECC network models with primarily a meshed
structure [11]. However, in this paper we show that the
tree-like portions of large transmission network models
behave differently then the meshed networks. This highlights a general conclusion that researchers should be
mindful of the heterogeneous structure of large power
grid networks. We therefore extend OPA to model the
tree-like portions of a larger network by reducing the
probability of overloaded line outaging in the tree-like
portions of the network. This bulk probability can be
phenomenologically determined for the different parts
of the network and combined with the other OPA parameters obtained from data in [11] to satisfactorily re-
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Figure 3. Probability distribution of the number of line outages per blackout for the historical
data and the 1553 and 2504 bus networks
produce observed bulk statistical features of the WECC
obtained from observed data, including the distribution
of blackout sizes, the average propagation, and the distribution of the number of line outages. This constitutes
validation of the more complete heterogeneous grid. We
also improve the modeling of load variation in OPA.
While the OPA model represents cascading processes
in a fairly simple manner, it has the unique feature
of computing the long-term reliability of the power
system as the network slowly upgrades in response to
blackouts. The inclusion of the continual engineering
efforts to maintain reliability in the modeling may
well be responsible for its successful reproduction of
observed WECC statistics. The validation of OPA on
a large network model increases confidence in this
approach to modeling the long-term reliability with
respect to cascading blackouts.
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Appendix: New model for load variation
The OPA model previously used a constant distribution of the variation of the demand to determine its variability. This has some problems. If we change the width
of the variation of the demand keeping constant the
critical margin, we see an abrupt change of the complex
system dynamics when the edges of this width are closer
to the critical margin, causing an abrupt increase in the
frequency and size of blackouts. Another consequence
of having a flat distribution for the variation of the
demand is that the probability of blackouts is relatively
independent of the width of the demand variation and
increases sharply when this reaches the critical margin.
These results do not seem very reasonable, so we have
built a demand variation model which is more consistent

with available data. The New England ISO has made
available electricity demand data for every hour of 304
days, which is 7296 hours. These data allow an estimate
of the variations of the peak demand. There are daily periodic changes and yearly periodic changes that we subtract from the data, because we do not want the average
variation of the demand but rather the statistical fluctuations around these periodic daily and yearly variations.
Since the OPA model uses the peak of the daily demand, for each day we can calculate the maximum load.
Fig. 11 shows this maximum load as a function of the
day during
 2πa year. Then, we fit the data in Fig. 11 with
x + c , where x is the day in the sequence.
a + b sin 180
The result of this fit is shown in Fig. 11 as a continuous
line. Therefore, this fit can be used to describe the yearly
evolution of the daily peak value of the load demand.
Subtracting this averaged value from the data, we obtain
the daily variation of the peak demand. We normalize
these values to the averaged value of the demand to
get the relative variation of the demand and we can use
this daily data to find its distribution. The distribution
together with a Gaussian fit is shown in Fig. 11.
From these results, we incorporated in OPA a variation of the load demand based on a Gaussian distribution
with a standard deviation of 7% as indicated by Fig. 11.
To avoid events with very large demand variations which
do not make sense, we limit the maximum variation
to three standard deviations from the mean. This new
method of modeling the demand variation is driven by
observed data and avoids the problems discussed at the
start of the Appendix.
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Figure 5. Rank function for the load shed normalized to the power demand and the probability
distribution of the number of line outages per blackout for the 19402 bus network compared
with historical data.

Figure 6. Rank functions of load shed normalized to the power demand, and the number of line
outages for the 4866, 7427, and 8590 bus networks.
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Figure 7. Three model networks of 8590, 7427, and 4866 buses reduced from 19402 bus network.

Figure 8. Rank functions of iterations per blackout and average propagation λ for the 4866,
7427, and 8590 bus networks.
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Figure 9. Match of 19402 bus network OPA results with data. Lefthand: Rank function for load
shed normalized to power demand. Righthand: PDF of number of line outages per blackout.

Figure 10. Match of 19402 bus network OPA results with historical data. Lefthand: Distribution
of the number of iterations per cascade. Righthand: Average propagation λ in each iteration.

Figure 11. Lefthand: Maximum load as a function of the day during a year and a sinusoidal fit.
Righthand: Distribution of the variation of the load around the sinusoidal average.
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